Mood disorders and the brain : depression, melancholia, and the historiography of psychiatry. by Jansson,  Åsa
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
07 May 2019
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Unknown
Citation for published item:
Jansson, Asa (2011) 'Mood disorders and the brain : depression, melancholia, and the historiography of
psychiatry.', Medical history., 55 (3). pp. 393-399.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0025727300005469
Publisher's copyright statement:
This article has been published in a revised form in Medical History[https://doi.org/10.1017/S0025727300005469]. This
version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in
derivative works. c© The Author(s) 2011. Published by Cambridge University Press.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Mood Disorders and the Brain:  
Depression, Melancholia, and the Historiography of Psychiatry 
 
ÅSA JANSSON* 
 
Keywords: Mood Disorder; Melancholia; Depression; Wilhelm Griesinger; Mental Reflex 
 
Introduction: ‘Mood Disorders’ as Historical Problem 
Despite the increasingly widespread availability of psychotropics believed to restore 
biochemical equilibrium in the brains of persons diagnosed with mood disorders,i the number 
of people suffering from such medical conditions appears to be increasing. According to The 
Royal College of Psychiatrists, ‘by 2020 it is estimated that depression will be the second 
most common disabling condition in the world’, a figure it derives from the World Health 
Organization.ii Depression is, it seems, rapidly becoming a global threat. In a trend that is 
mirrored in  much of the West, the number of prescriptions dispensed for antidepressants in 
the UK has doubled in the last decade and is continuing to rise. The need for a critical 
perspective on mood disorders is growing.  
At the start of the millennium, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen lamented the ‘epistemic 
timidity’ of historians of psychiatry, when they ‘are in fact in a position of saying something 
of capital importance about the subject of mental illness.’iii Reiterating this, I want to suggest 
that historians of psychiatry are best suited to provide a critical perspective on mood 
disorders and that they must continue to broaden and deepen their research field in order to 
do so. 
We can begin by considering how the concept of ‘mood disorders’ emerged in the 
early decades of the nineteenth century. Such a history must also be a history of the emotions 
and of the sciences that investigate these. Moreover, as with any history concerned with 
disease concepts, iv historians of psychiatry must pay close attention to nosological texts in 
tracing how psychiatric categories were created in relation to clinical practices and to other 
realms of medical science. Finally, our inquiry must incorporate contemporaneous 
developments in experimental neurophysiology that nineteenth-century psychiatrists, 
particularly in Germany and Britain, drew extensively upon to explain how emotions 
functioned and could become diseased.  
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Twenty-first century psychiatrists, psychologists, and neuroscientists are fond of 
looking to the nineteenth century in support of claims for continuity and universality of 
present knowledge about the emotions and their disorders.v Historians, too, have attempted to 
establish parallels between today’s clinical depression and nineteenth-century conditions such 
as melancholia and neurasthenia.vi Such claims should not, however, be taken for granted, nor 
are the presumed links inevitable.  
This paper provides a short narrative on how melancholia was reconceptualised by an 
influential German psychiatrist, Wilhelm Griesinger (1817–68), in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. He drew on neurophysiological work on the sensory–motor reflex, 
applying the reflexive model to the realm of ideas and emotions in order to situate the 
recently created category, ‘affective insanity’, within a biomedical framework. Through the 
metaphor of reflexive action, the emotions could be explained as the result of a potentially 
involuntary mental process with the ability to become disordered. Nineteenth-century 
melancholia, conceptualised within this framework, was specific to a particular historical 
moment – it had its own regime of somatisation and biologisation, and its own aetiology and 
trajectory. It follows that if the historical specificity of nineteenth-century biomedical 
melancholia can be demonstrated, depression as a universal condition must equally become 
open to re-interpretation and be subjected to closer historical investigation.  
However, the story presented not only highlights historical difference: what also 
emerges is a continuity of language which facilitates the idea of disordered emotions as 
scientifically sound in the twenty-first century. Griesinger’s metaphor has survived to the 
present, providing a linguistic template that allows for ‘mood disorders’ to exist as a plausible 
and meaningful medical concept. 
  
The Emergence of Disordered Emotions 
German Berrios has suggested that: 
 
[Up] to the Napoleonic Wars, melancholia was but a rag-bag of insanity states whose only 
common denominator was the presence of a few (as opposed to many) delusions. In practice, 
therefore, it is highly likely that it included cases of schizophrenia. Sadness and low affect 
(which were no doubt present in some cases) were not considered as defining symptoms. 
Indeed, states of non-psychotic depression, of the type that nowadays would be classified as 
DSM IV ‘Major Depressive Episode’ would not have been called ‘melancholia’ at all. During 
the eighteenth century these states were classified as ‘vapours’, ‘spleen’, or ‘hypochondria’, 
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i.e. what Cullen called ‘neuroses’, and Sydenham and Willis, the previous century, had called 
‘nervous disorders’.vii 
 
‘Retrospective diagnosis’ is a practice from which historians of medicine often seek to 
distance themselves, yet few have questioned the claim that clinical depression has always 
been part of the human condition, albeit under a variety of names. It is tempting to take for 
granted that as humans we have been subject to and are capable of the same kinds of 
emotions throughout our history and that that, in fact, is a large part of what makes us human. 
However, historians of the emotions have suggested that emotional repertoires change over 
time and between societies.viii Moreover, as Thomas Dixon has shown, ‘emotions’ as a 
concept has its own history. It emerged within the context of modern psychology, gradually 
replacing older terms such as passions, appetites, and sentiments that had belonged to and 
made sense within a world-view where Christianity was the dominant source of knowledge. 
As ways of understanding the human mind and body were profoundly transformed within a 
modern scientific framework, ‘the emotions’ as an all-compassing category and process that 
was at once physiological and psychological – and not necessarily subject to volition – soon 
eclipsed its spiritual predecessors in medico–scientific literature.ix  
When investigating how mental disease categories emerge and function, historians of 
psychiatry cannot, however, confine themselves to considering external symptoms – in this 
case emotional expressions. How these conditions are internally explained is equally central 
to their history. In this way, depression, as presently understood, has a descriptive 
psychopathological component, based on ‘symptoms’ patients express; but an equally 
important, and defining, part of this condition is that it is understood as a biochemical 
imbalance, which can potentially be corrected with antidepressants. Following from this, one 
cannot simply equate nineteenth-century melancholia and twentieth- and twenty-first-century 
depression either with each other or with the nervous disorders of the seventeenth century, or 
the neuroses of the eighteenth.  
With the rise of a new brand of European psychiatry in the middle of the century 
melancholia was reconfigured as an emotional disorder with a neurophysiological basis. 
Wilhelm Griesinger was one of the early figures central to bringing about this development. 
His system of classification awarded a comparatively prominent place to melancholia, which 
he viewed as the most treatable form of madness. What has been curiously overlooked, 
however, is how Griesinger came to arrive at his conceptualisation of melancholia as a 
biomedical disorder of the emotions. A closer look at his theory of disordered emotions sheds 
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light on how the concept of mood disorders became possible and plausible. It also highlights 
differences rather than uniformity where melancholia and clinical depression are concerned, 
suggesting that these are two distinct disease concepts whose historical trajectories demand 
close and critical inquiry, and which it is the business of historians of psychiatry to trace and 
explicate.    
 In constructing his psychiatric nosology, Griesinger drew to an extent on the work of 
earlier mental scientists, particularly Esquirol and Guislain, as well as on his own clinical 
experience. However, in arriving at an internal, biomedical model for mental disease, he 
primarily found his inspiration in experimental neurophysiology, particularly the work of 
Johannes Müller. The latter’s concept of mental reflex was at the heart of the model 
Griesinger put forward, proving the foundation for his understanding of how the emotions 
could become diseased.  
With experiments carried out on living animals by nineteenth-century physiologists 
the concept of reflex action was dressed in the language of modern empirical science.x Müller 
built on the sensory–motor reflex arc developed by Marshall Hall early in the century. Hall, 
however, rejected the idea that the brain might be involved in reflex action, marking the 
medulla as the final destination point for external stimuli. Müller disagreed on this point, 
since his experiments led him to believe that there must be cerebral involvement in the 
reaction that occurred. He proposed a reflex occurring in the mind, a model which was soon 
extended beyond a model for external sensation triggering bodily movement into the realm of 
ideas.xi This emerging neurophysiological mental reflex would provide an explanatory 
framework for how the emotions were produced. 
In an 1843 article published two years prior to the first edition of his influential 
textbook, Griesinger sought to explain mental, and particularly emotional, functioning 
through the reflex concept. The paper ‘Ueber psychische Reflexactionen’xii has received scant 
attention by historians,xiii despite laying the foundation for Griesinger’s vastly influential 
psychiatric nosology.  
 
Griesinger’s Pathology of Ideas and Emotions:  
From Mental Reflex to Cerebral Irritation 
Griesinger followed Müller in suggesting that the brain is involved in reflex action, arguing 
in addition to this that sensation could pass through the brain, triggering reaction, without 
alerting consciousness. Moreover, such transmission of unconscious sensation is conducted 
more smoothly and efficiently than that involving the will. All impressions, however, 
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whether registered in the awareness or not, are collected in the brain, where they are 
transformed into ideas, or mental images [Vorstellungen]: 
 
Some sensations do not reach the consciousness, and others do. Both kinds of impressions 
form the totality of all exciting factors [Erregungen] of the central organ [the brain]; the 
entire content of the sensory site of the latter is equal to the content of all centripetal 
impressions.... The central organ does not hold these impressions in individual fibres, but 
produces from all of them, continuously, a script [Facit] containing the summary of all 
excitations. When this state is seemingly calm it regulates and upkeeps the tone [of the 
brain].... The centripetal impressions from the immediate site (the mental organ 
[Sinnesorgane]), and from the remote regions (from the spinal marrow outwards) are 
dispersed in the brain, where they undergo a further change and become the source of 
Vorstellungen.xiv 
 
The metaphor of a Facit, being the summary of all (external and internal) sensory 
impressions, allows Griesinger to describe how the mind operates. The Facit contains all 
mental information, some of which has passed through the consciousness, and some that has 
been stored without triggering awareness. All these impressions are capable of reacting upon 
one another, and in doing so they have the ability to synthesise and create new ideas 
(Vorstellungen). Such Vorstellungen are wholly endogenous, and may be utterly unrelated to 
any external stimuli. Moreover, ideas are kept in ‘mental storages’ [geistigen Vorraths], and 
when new impressions reach the brain from outside, these are prone to react with the 
previously stored images to produce new ones.xv 
It is this ability of the brain to react both to external and internal stimuli, and to 
produce from any combination of these entirely new impressions and mental images, which is 
the source of mental disease. When an increasing number of negative impressions are stored 
and these react both with further external irritants and with each other internally, the brain is 
subjected to repeated ‘irritation’ [Reize]. Eventually, the process of mental reaction – the 
reflexive action – becomes distorted, and subsequently diseased. The brain begins to produce 
morbid reactions, such as feelings of displeasure [Unlust], in response to factors that would 
not trigger such reactions in a healthy mind.xvi  
There are, then, two metaphors at work here which together make up Griesinger’s 
model for the emotions: a script containing mental images, or ideas, and the ability of these 
ideas to react upon one another though a process similar to sensory–motor reflex action. The 
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mental reflex as expounded by Griesinger was subsequently taken up by other European 
psychiatrists, such as Henry Maudsley in Britain, and Richard von Krafft-Ebing in Germany, 
xvii and came to constitute a central element in the biomedical psychiatry of the mid-to-late 
nineteenth century. It provided the necessary mechanism by which milder forms of insanity – 
disorders of affect – could be explained. These were conditions which did not normally turn 
up lesions of the brain during psychiatric autopsies,xviii thus it offered a way of explaining 
milder forms of insanity within a medico–scientific – in this case neurophysiological – 
framework. 
 
Conclusion 
For Griesinger, the starting point for all forms of insanity was the ‘states of mental 
depression’ which included hypochondria, and simple and delusional melancholia.xix These 
formed the first pathological stage to be induced by morbid reflex action resulting from 
persistent irritation of the brain. If left untreated, melancholia could and often did deteriorate 
into mania and later dementia, an idea that can be found in the writings of a number of 
prominent British mental scientists in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Nineteenth-century biomedical melancholia bears little resemblance to today’s 
depression. The former is a disorder of the emotions where the intellect remains largely 
unaffected in the early stages of the disease. External and internal stimuli react upon the brain, 
cause irritation, and produce morbid emotional reactions. This leads to low mood, 
introspection, and despair, often accompanied by intense feelings of guilt and thoughts of 
suicide. If patients are not treated quickly, their mental state deteriorates, and they start to 
experience delusions, often of a religious nature. This is the progression from simple to 
delusional melancholia that, if left untreated, may eventually progress into mania and 
dementia.xx 
 Clinical depression is a mood disorder characterised by depressed mood, inertia, 
appetite changes, lethargy, indifference, difficulty thinking and concentrating, feelings of 
guilt and worthlessness, and thoughts of suicide.xxi The condition strikes women to a much 
larger extent than men.xxii External factors and internal brain chemistry are seen to work in 
conjunction to produce morbid symptoms. Internally, the illness is linked to deficiencies of a 
number of neurotransmitters, particularly serotonin and dopamine. The drugs currently most 
favoured to treat this condition are believed to regulate postsynaptic re-uptake of serotonin, 
thus improving and stabilising mood.xxiii   
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However, while we are dealing with two separate disease concepts, both of which 
must be subjected to closer historical scrutiny, they are made meaningful through the same 
metaphor. The idea that emotional reactions occur reflexively and involuntarily in response to 
internal and external stimuli persists in the present and continues to make possible and 
plausible the concept mood disorders.  
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